Titlebook: Integrated Circuit Authentication; Hardware Trojans and Mohammad Tehranipoor,Hassan Salmani,Xuehui Zhang Book 2014 Springer International P

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Design for Hardware Trust: Dummy Scan Flip-Flop Insertion,nputs are supplied by nets with low-transition probabilities to reduce their impact on circuit side-channel signals such as power and delay. Automatic Test Pattern Generation (ATPG) methods used in manufacturing tests for detecting defects do so by operating on Trojan-free netlists. Therefore, exist

儿童

Design for Hardware Trust: Layout-Aware Scan Cell Reordering,of a circuit [1, 2]. In power-based side-channel signal analysis, it is possible to extract a Trojan signal by monitoring power pads/ports, even in the presence of various types of noise including measurement noise, ambient noise, and other random signal variations that manifest during the circuit o

Arthr-

Design for Hardware Trust: Ring Oscillator Network, dynamic current measurements [1]. This method monitors power fluctuations and differentiates fluctuations due to hardware Trojans from fluctuations due to measurement noise and process variations. This method considers Trojan impact on the power consumption of neighboring cells and the entire IC. A

得意人

Design Vulnerability Analysis,asive throughout high-level implementation. Their details are not delivered most of the time; therefore, IPs may stealthily deviate from the designers’ determined specifications. Rouge designers or manufacturers far from the design house can tamper with synthesized designs by inserting extra gates o

思考

Trojan Prevention: Built-In Self-Authentication,ls. As companies increasingly outsource design and fabrication for economic reasons, it has become easier for adversaries to implant a Trojan by modifying the layout of a circuit during GDSII development and fabrication. A circuit’s unused spaces provide great opportunities for Trojan insertion.

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Counterfeit ICs: Detection and Prevention of Recycled ICs Using On-Chip Sensors,feit component is defined as an electronic part that is not genuine because it [D1]: (i) is an unauthorized copy; (ii) does not conform to the original component manufacturer’s design, model, and/or performance; (iii) is not produced by the original component manufacturer or is produced by unauthori

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