Titlebook: Information Security and Privacy; 18th Australasian Co Colin Boyd,Leonie Simpson Conference proceedings 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelb

神圣在玷污

Cryptanalysis of Helix and Phelix Revisitedtacks on Helix. Motivated by these attacks, Phelix was proposed and selected as a Phase 2 focus cipher for both Profile 1 and Profile 2 by the eSTREAM project, but was not advanced to Phase 3 mainly due to a key recovery attack by Wu and Preneel when the prohibition against reusing a nonce is violat

财产

Attacks on Multi-Prime RSA with Small Prime DifferencePRSA is less effective than that on RSA (see Hinek et al.’s work at SAC 2003), which means that one can use a smaller private exponent in the MPRSA than that in the original RSA. However, our attacks show that private exponents which are significantly beyond Hinek’s bound may be insecure when the pr

裤子

Factoring Multi-power RSA Modulus , = ,,, with Partial Known Bits. Up to now, there is no known polynomial-time algorithm to solve it with classical computers. However, in practice side-channel attacks usually cause serious damage: Even if a small proportion of bits in the secret primes is leaked, one may efficiently factor..In this paper, we study the problem of

heckle

Toward Separating the Strong Adaptive Pseudo-freeness from the Strong RSA Assumption, Fiore and Warinschi proposed the adaptive pseudo-free group as a generalization of pseudo-free group. They showed that the RSA group . is pseudo-free even if the adversary against pseudo-freeness is allowed to operate adaptively, provided that the adaptive behavior of the adversary is restricted b

Indent

Minkowski Sum Based Lattice Construction for Multivariate Simultaneous Coppersmith’s Technique and Afor simultaneous equations and propose a method to construct a lattice by combining lattices for solving single equations. As applications, we consider a new RSA cryptanalysis. Our algorithm can factor an RSA modulus from ℓ ≥ 2 pairs of RSA public exponents with the common modulus corresponding to s

反感

ANN

男学院

Key-Dependent Message Chosen-Ciphertext Security of the Cramer-Shoup Cryptosystem that depend on the secret key. In a multi-user surrounding, a key-dependent message can be any polynomial-time function .(.., .., …, ..) in the secret keys of the users. The Key-Dependent Message Chosen-Ciphertext (KDM-CCA2) security can be similarly defined if the adversary is also allowed to quer

cuticle

Black-Box Separations and Their Adaptability to the Non-uniform Modelle relative to which the base primitive exists but there are no secure instances of the constructed primitive. It is often beyond our current reach to construct a fixed oracle with such properties because it is difficult to prove the existence of secure base primitives. To overcome this gap, randomi

母猪