Titlebook: Individual and Collective Choice and Social Welfare; Essays in Honor of N Constanze Binder,Giulio Codognato,Yongsheng Xu Book 2015 Springer

APNEA

Climate Change and Social Choice Theory.However, it is suggested that a belief equilibrium with regard to the appropriate response to climate change depends on the creation of a fundamental social principle of “guardianship of our planetary home.” It is suggested that this will involve conflict between entrenched economic interests and o

Mri485

头盔

猛击

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A Note on Incompleteness, Transitivity and Suzumura Consistencyamines the implications of these claims for the theory of rational choice. I propose a new choice rule—Strong Maximality—and argue that it better captures rational preference-based choice than other more familiar rules. Suzumura consistency of preferences is shown to be both necessary and sufficient

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Rationality and Context-Dependent Preferencest choice situations on the basis of a fixed preference ordering defined over the set of all possible options. This implies that a rational agent’s preferences cannot be context-dependent. This paper outlines a simple framework for defining context-dependence of preferences and for discussing relatio

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FLAX

Moral Responsibility and Individual Choiceed responsibility function that describes for any choice situation the alternatives for which the agent would be deemed responsible if she were to choose one of them in that situation. We show under which conditions a responsibility function can be rationalized by information about which courses of

GENUS

Multi-Profile Intertemporal Social Choice: A Survey result hinges on the assumption that the population is finite. For infinite populations, there exist non-dictatorial social welfare functions satisfying Arrow’s axioms and they can be described by their corresponding collections of decisive coalitions. We review contributions that explore whether t

绝缘

Minimal Maskin Monotonic Extensions of Tournament Solutionsute the minimal Maskin monotonic extensions for the following rules: The top-cycle, the uncovered set, the iterated uncovered set, the minimal covering set and the Copeland rule. Moreover, we characterize the minimal Maskin monotonic extensions of the social choice rules that are generated by the to