书目名称 | Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing | 副标题 | A Game-theoretic App | 编辑 | Youqi Li,Fan Li,Chuan Zhang | 视频video | | 概述 | Clarifying the equilibrium analysis for incentive mechanism in mobile crowdsensing.Providing game-theoretic solutions for designing incentive mechanism in more practical mobile crowdsensing.Understand | 丛书名称 | SpringerBriefs in Computer Science | 图书封面 |  | 描述 | .Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is emerging as a novel sensing paradigm in the Internet of Things (IoTs) due to the proliferation of smart devices (e.g., smartphones, wearable devices) in people’s daily lives. These ubiquitous devices provide an opportunity to harness the wisdom of crowds by recruiting mobile users to collectively perform sensing tasks, which largely collect data about a wide range of human activities and the surrounding environment. However, users suffer from resource consumption such as battery, processing power, and storage, which discourages users’ participation. To ensure the participation rate, it is necessary to employ an incentive mechanism to compensate users’ costs such that users are willing to take part in crowdsensing...This book sheds light on the design of incentive mechanisms for MCS in the context of game theory. Particularly, this book presents several game-theoretic models for MCS in different scenarios. In Chapter 1, the authors present an overview of MCS and state the significance of incentive mechanism for MCS. Then, in Chapter 2, 3, 4, and 5, the authors propose a long-term incentive mechanism, a fair incentive mechanism, a collaborative incentive | 出版日期 | Book 2024 | 关键词 | Mobile crowdsourcing; Data collection; Incentive mechanism; Game theory; Stackelberg game; Pricing; Mobile | 版次 | 1 | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6921-0 | isbn_softcover | 978-981-99-6920-3 | isbn_ebook | 978-981-99-6921-0Series ISSN 2191-5768 Series E-ISSN 2191-5776 | issn_series | 2191-5768 | copyright | The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapor |
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