| 书目名称 | Hume on the Self and Personal Identity | | 编辑 | Dan O‘Brien | | 视频video | | | 概述 | Attempts to understand David Hume’s conception of the self.Acknowledges Hume’s dissatisfaction with his own no-self view.Traces connections between Hume and other concepts of the self | | 丛书名称 | Philosophers in Depth | | 图书封面 |  | | 描述 | .This book brings together a team of international scholars to attempt to understand David Hume’s conception of the self. The standard interpretation is that he holds a no-self view: we are just bundles of conscious experiences, thoughts and emotions. There is nothing deeper to us, no core, no essence, no soul. In the Appendix to .A .Treatise of Human Nature., though, Hume admits to being dissatisfied with such an account and Part One of this book explores why this might be so. Part Two turns to Books 2 and 3 of the .Treatise., where Hume moves away from the ‘fiction’ of a simple self, to the complex idea we have of our flesh and blood selves, those with emotional lives, practical goals, and social relations with others. In Part Three connections are traced between Hume and Madhyamaka Buddhism, Husserl and the phenomenological tradition, and contemporary cognitive science.. | | 出版日期 | Book 2022 | | 关键词 | Hume; Personal Identity; Self; Cognitive science; Scepticism | | 版次 | 1 | | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04275-1 | | isbn_softcover | 978-3-031-04277-5 | | isbn_ebook | 978-3-031-04275-1Series ISSN 2947-552X Series E-ISSN 2947-5538 | | issn_series | 2947-552X | | copyright | The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerl |
The information of publication is updating
|
|
发表于 2025-3-21 19:30:19
