| 书目名称 | Formulating Principal-Agent Service Contracts for a Revenue Generating Unit |
| 编辑 | Shuo Zeng,Moshe Dror |
| 视频video | http://file.papertrans.cn/347/346210/346210.mp4 |
| 概述 | Examines the contractual options between an owner of a revenue generating unit and a provider of repair service for this unit.Identifies the exogenous conditions exhaustively under which a risk-neutra |
| 丛书名称 | SpringerBriefs in Operations Management |
| 图书封面 |  |
| 描述 | .This book examines contractual options for a performance based contract between an owner of a revenue generating unit and a repair agent for such unit. The framework of the analysis is that of economists‘ principal-agent problem. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled as a Markov process with an undetermined time horizon. For a risk neutral principal, the authors identify the conditions under which a principal contracts with a risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking agent and derive the principal‘s optimal offer together with the agent‘s optimal service capacity response. In essence, the book provides an extensive formulating analysis of principal-agent contracts given any exogenous parameter values. Ultimately a small number of formulas cover a large spectrum of principal-agent conditions.. |
| 出版日期 | Book 2016 |
| 关键词 | Freight Transport; Pareto Optimal Contract; Principal-agent Model; Risk-averse; Risk-neutral; Risk-seekin |
| 版次 | 1 |
| doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18672-6 |
| isbn_softcover | 978-3-319-18671-9 |
| isbn_ebook | 978-3-319-18672-6Series ISSN 2365-8320 Series E-ISSN 2365-8339 |
| issn_series | 2365-8320 |
| copyright | The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerl |
|Archiver|手机版|小黑屋|
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