| 书目名称 | Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances |
| 编辑 | Demet Çetiner |
| 视频video | |
| 概述 | Explains in detail how the operations research methods are applied to a real-life problem as revenue sharing of airline alliances.Combines concepts in game theory with OR methods.Includes comprehensiv |
| 丛书名称 | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems |
| 图书封面 |  |
| 描述 | A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods. |
| 出版日期 | Book 2013 |
| 关键词 | Airline Alliance; Fairness; Game Theory; Revenue Management; Revenue Sharing |
| 版次 | 1 |
| doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35822-7 |
| isbn_softcover | 978-3-642-35821-0 |
| isbn_ebook | 978-3-642-35822-7Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957 |
| issn_series | 0075-8442 |
| copyright | Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013 |
发表于 2025-3-21 17:57:36
