Titlebook: Evolutionary Computation in Economics and Finance; Shu-Heng Chen Book 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002 Finance.agents.algorithm

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Kerstin Martens,Klaus Dieter Wolfalgorithms can be described as a specific form of evolutionary game. It will be pointed out that GA learning results in a series of near Nash equilibria which during the learning process build up to finally reach a neighborhood of an evolutionarily stable state. In order to clarify this point, a con

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Spanish External Trade and EEC Preferences,ion-making experiments. We begin by describing symbolic regression and our implemen-tation of this technique using genetic programming. We provide a brief overview of how our algorithm works and how it can be used to uncover simple data generating functions that have the flavor of strategic rules. W

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Maria Angela Biasiotti,Fabrizio Turchi type of decision rules that agents use. Evolution of the moving average and least squares forecasting techniques results in a speculative attack on one of the currencies and that currency’s eventual collapse. Addition of the rules that evolve the portfolio fractions directly brings in persistent vo

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Simona Gumuliauskaitė,Kęstutis Arbačiauskasomic welfare of market participants is linked spatially through production externalities is unclear. Trade will reflect the interaction of bargaining agents whose incentives vary with the relative physical location of both the buyer and seller. For the permit system to internalise the costs of pollu

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Studies in Literature and ReligionIt is shown that capacity asymmetries between work suppliers and employers can result in two distinct hysteresis effects, network and behavioral, when work suppliers and employers interact strategically and evolve their worksite behaviors over time. These hysteresis effects result in persistent hete

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