Titlebook: Ethics and Self-Knowledge; Respect for Self-Int Peter Lucas Book 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 Ethical theory.Foucault.Heg

SIT

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-92253-3l wrongs and radical theorising. This chapter aims to show, via a range of examples (Martha Nussbaum’s reformist attempt to analyse sexual objectification; Marx’s analysis of commodification; and the ethics of genetic databases), that an ethic of self-interpretation, suited to tackle interpretive mo

菊花

Das verdächtig Populäre in der Musikir capacity for undistorted self-interpretation, in addition to respecting their capacity for autonomous action – lay behind the widespread but somewhat inchoate concern with such interpretive moral wrongs as objectification, yet had gone entirely unnoticed by previous enquirers. The primary concern

枯萎将要

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-26767-4bout the nature and possibility of self-knowledge that are unlikely to be sympathetically viewed in the generally liberal and anti-essentialist atmosphere of contemporary applied and professional ethics. This chapter aims to show how a non-essentialistic alternative might be developed, which preserv

侵蚀

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01766-7ld suffer from significant limitations. Since he rejects essentialism, it seems Heidegger must regard an authentic existence as at best meritorious, rather than in any sense obligatory. Moreover, although he is sensitive to the consequences of adopting an instrumentalised self-conception, he does no

Deduct

杂色

美食家

1387-6678 es an accessible introduction to key primary sources in the This book explores the theoretical basis of our ethical obligations to others as self-knowing beings - this task being envisaged as an essential supplement to a traditional ethic of respect for persons. Authoritative knowledge of others bri

祖传

heterodox

自由职业者

Das undisziplinierte Geschlechtace in a range of mutually irreducible basic principles. Thus the fragmentation of the idea of the moral person has been accompanied by a decline in the apparent significance of the principle of respect for persons. In the light of this decline, it is reasonable to ask what future the principle of respect for persons can now have.