Titlebook: Ethical Intuitionism; Michael Huemer Book 2005 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2005 cognitivism.ethics.mora

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Further ObjectionsIn the last three chapters, I have addressed three of the most prominent objections to intuitionism, those concerned with intuitionism’s ability to account for moral knowledge, its ability to explain and resolve moral disagreement, and its ability to account for moral motivation. In this chapter, I address miscellaneous further objections.

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https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230597051cognitivism; ethics; morality

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Introductiontion calls for an . as an answer: this is a statement that inherently makes a positive or negative evaluation of something.. The following are examples of evaluative statements: ‘One should keep one’s promises’; ‘Happiness is good’; ‘Pol Pot is evil’; ‘Honesty is a virtue’. The last is evaluative be

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Moral Knowledge the basis of observation. How, if at all, can these claims be known? Is it rational to think any of these claims are true? In the present chapter, I explain how we can know or be justified in believing evaluative statements on the basis of ethical intuition.