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Titlebook: Equity, Efficiency and Evolutionary Stability in Bargaining Games with Joint Production; Manfred Königstein Book 2000 Springer-Verlag Berl

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书目名称Equity, Efficiency and Evolutionary Stability in Bargaining Games with Joint Production
编辑Manfred Königstein
视频video
概述Includes supplementary material:
丛书名称Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
图书封面Titlebook: Equity, Efficiency and Evolutionary Stability in Bargaining Games with Joint Production;  Manfred Königstein Book 2000 Springer-Verlag Berl
描述Result 1.10 Simple equity standards were superior to more complex ones, even though the latter might be economically more relevant. Result 1.11 Equity based on quantity (input) and return (output) was most successful and received a hit rate of almost i within a range of 10%, i.e., within a distance of ±5% of the predicted share. Result 1.12 A substantial share of observations is consistent with egalitarian considerations. 1.7 Summary The study investigates the predictive power of equity theory and strategic concepts within ultimatum bargaining with advance produc­ tion. This is different from many other experimental studies on non­ cooperative bargaining games, since usually the ressource to be dis­ tributed between the subjects is given by the experimenter. Here, the "pie" is produced via joint production effort. This scenario is more general than bargaining without production, and we think it is more natural as well. The description of the raw data showed that the production choices are considerably dispersed, but nevertheless systematically biased to­ ward the respective player‘s efficient production level. The distribu­ tions of demanded return shares and demanded surplus share
出版日期Book 2000
关键词Bargaining; Evolutionary Game Theory; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie; Experimental Economics; Experimentelle
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45782-1
isbn_softcover978-3-540-66955-5
isbn_ebook978-3-642-45782-1Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957
issn_series 0075-8442
copyrightSpringer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000
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Efficiency and Evolution of Social Preferences and Prosocial Behavior,ons have only a negligible influence on each other. This is certainly an extreme description of the world. At the other extreme one might model social life as a sequence of two person games in which both players know each other very well and were each individual’s well-being depends to a large exten
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Book 2000 based on quantity (input) and return (output) was most successful and received a hit rate of almost i within a range of 10%, i.e., within a distance of ±5% of the predicted share. Result 1.12 A substantial share of observations is consistent with egalitarian considerations. 1.7 Summary The study in
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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-2373-7erate economic efficiency and, moreover, that such preferences can be evolutionarily stable. Since social preferences may generate prosocial actions the study is at the same time on the evolution of prosocial behavior.
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