| 书目名称 | Eisenhower‘s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61 | | 编辑 | Saki Dockrill | | 视频video | | | 图书封面 |  | | 描述 | The New Look sought to formulate a more selective and flexible response to Communist challenges. The New Look was not simply a `bigger bang for a buck‘ nor merely a device for achieving a balanced budget, nor did it amount solely to a strategy of massive retaliation, as is commonly assumed. Dr Dockrill‘s incisive revisionist analysis of the subject throws new light on US ambitious global strategy during the Eisenhower years. | | 出版日期 | Book 1996 | | 关键词 | budget; communism; Europe; Policy | | 版次 | 1 | | doi | https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230372337 | | isbn_ebook | 978-0-230-37233-7 | | copyright | Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1996 |
| 1 |
Front Matter |
|
|
Abstract
|
| 2 |
,Introduction, |
Saki Dockrill |
|
Abstract
Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected president of the United States in November 1952 and he served the two full terms. At a press conference in February 1960, Eisenhower was asked ‘what do you think will be the major problems of the man who succeeds you?’. He replied:
|
| 3 |
,From Truman to Eisenhower, |
Saki Dockrill |
|
Abstract
In July 1945, US intelligence (G2) described the Soviet Union as having ‘a naked lust for world conquest’, while . earlier, Henry Stimson, the secretary of war (who was initially optimistic about Soviet intentions), the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William D. Leahy, the secretary of the navy, James V. Forrestal, and Averell Harriman, the ambassador to Moscow, had assumed either an anti-Soviet posture or had become extremely suspicious of Soviet intentions.. Their hard-line views did not carry much weight in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Stalin was one of the most popular figures along with Winston S. Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek in American opinion polls between 1942 and 1945, and even in September 1945, more than half the US populace believed that the Soviet Union could be trusted to cooperate with the United States in the postwar world..
|
| 4 |
,The Road to NSC 162/2, |
Saki Dockrill |
|
Abstract
Despite Eisenhower’s victory in the presidential election of 1952, the 83rd Congress was only marginally controlled by the Republicans. During his first year as president, Eisenhower was more frustrated by the activities of Republican legislators than by the Democrats — for instance, Senator John Bricker’s amendment designed to reduce presidential authority over foreign affairs and the intrusion of Senator Joseph MacCarthy of Wisconsin (the chairman of the Senate sub-committee on government operations) into internal security matters..
|
| 5 |
,The ‘New Look’ in Nuclear Deterrence Strategy, |
Saki Dockrill |
|
Abstract
The basic mechanism of deterrence is psychological, that is the threat that ‘creates’ in an opponent ‘fear, anxiety, doubt’ — ‘although you can hurt us terribly, if you do we will pay you back by hurting you worse.’. Deterrence was by no means a new concept to postwar American policy makers and strategists. Franklin Roosevelt told his close advisers at a White House meeting on 14 November 1938 that the expansion of American air power would deter Hitler and Japan. The president was well aware of the advantages of utilising the concept of deterrence as a means of furthering his foreign policy goals.. Similarly, the United States Army Air Department spelled out the strategic role of air power on 15 September 1939: ‘the only reasonable hope of avoiding air attack is in the possession of such power of retaliation as to deter an enemy from initiating air warfare.’.
|
| 6 |
,Collective Security in Western Europe, |
Saki Dockrill |
|
Abstract
The Republican administration followed its Democrat predecessor in adopting a Europe-first strategy. As Rosenberg, Wampler and Trachtenberg argue, there was strong continuity in American strategy for the defence of western Europe between the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.. Both considered the presence of combat forces in western Europe and Germany as essential in order to resist the Soviet military threat, despite the increasing availability of nuclear weapons during that period. The difference was perhaps a matter of emphasis, with the Eisenhower administration placing more reliance on nuclear weapons, in an effort to compensate for the inability and unwillingness of America’s NATO allies in Europe to provide sufficient troops. This comprised part of what Gaddis termed the ‘asymmetrical response’ to the nature of the Communist threat. More importantly, it was the Eisenhower administration that first raised the question of who should provide troops for NATO.
|
| 7 |
,The Challenge in Asia and Europe, |
Saki Dockrill |
|
Abstract
Washington’s anxiety to re-deploy US troops in Europe and to introduce nuclear weapons there were the two main pillars of the New Look in Europe. However, the administration clearly underestimated the importance of the American military presence to their European allies. Moreover, NATO’s agreement to the concept of the ‘long haul’ and to the commitment of ‘new approach studies’ by SACEUR in December 1953 did not signify its unreserved approval of the US approach to nuclear weapons. This soon became clear when the United States enunciated its massive retaliation strategy in January 1954. Trachtenberg summarises the way in which the United States tried to apply the New Look in Europe: ‘You want forward defense? Then come up with the troops. But if you can’t, then don’t complain if we end up relying on nuclear weapons’..
|
| 8 |
,Aspirations for Atomic Peace, |
Saki Dockrill |
|
Abstract
The president continued to seek a balance between United States national security requirements and its healthy economy. US national security policy was also closely concerned with America’s cold war policy and its foreign policy in general. It would have been, of course, easier for Eisenhower to consummate the New Look if he had had strong and united support from the Republican party. Eisenhower’s relationship with the Republican Old Guard was a difficult one. He described the majority leader, Senator Knowland (who had succeeded senator Taft in July 1953) as ‘cumbersome’, a man who did not have ‘the sharp mind and the great experience that Taft did’. Despite their differences over foreign policy and national security issues, Eisenhower admired Taft for his loyalty to the Republican party and for his leadership ability in Congress.. By contrast, the president was impatient with Knowland’s extremist views — the Californian senator once compared the defence of Dien Bien Phu to the defence of ‘the Alamo and also Bataan and Corregidor’. Eisenhower regarded the senator’s demand for a US naval ‘blockade’ off the coast of mainland China (during the first offshore crisis), or for a total tr
|
| 9 |
,The Indirect Approach and Liberation, |
Saki Dockrill |
|
Abstract
The Eisenhower administration had been searching since 1953 for a more flexible foreign and national security policy in order to cope with the realities of a post-Stalin Soviet Union, which was constantly asserting its genuine commitment to world peace. Accordingly, while the structure of American armed forces was being transformed in response to the New Look doctrine, the New Look itself had been subjected to a number of compromises. These included the postponement of any drastic American troop reductions in Europe, a more circumspect approach towards collective security, a de-emphasis on ‘massive retaliation’ rhetoric, given the greater availability of tactical nuclear weapons, and a less forceful posture towards the Soviet-Communist bloc as a result of the growing realisation of the futility of, and dangers inherent in, general nuclear war. The latter culminated in the massive publicity surrounding the Geneva summit conference whereby the United States was extolled as a peace-loving country..
|
| 10 |
,The Soviet Economic and Technical Challenge, |
Saki Dockrill |
|
Abstract
American foreign aid policy, and especially mutual security programmes, are an important part of the non-military aspect of US national security policy. The Republican administration had initially aimed at a progressive reduction of foreign aid, by encouraging, instead, the liberalisation of world trade and private foreign investment, in order to ‘enhance the capacity of free world nations for self-support and defense’.. As discussed earlier, foreign aid policy was a divisive issue within the administration. The president and the secretary of state were both keen to preserve and, if necessary, to increase American mutual security programmes to support their allies and to protect the free world. Just as Eisenhower’s views on East—West trade were based on pragmatism and sound strategy — he told Radford on 18 April 1956 that he ‘did see positive value in pressing forward with trade with the Satellites in Eastern Europe’. — the president continued to believe that the foreign aid programme was ‘the cheapest insurance in the world’, since the ‘want of a few million bucks had put the United States into a war in Korea’.. The Treasury Department and the Bureau of the Budget took a less gene
|
| 11 |
,Facing the Nuclear Equation, |
Saki Dockrill |
|
Abstract
Despite Eisenhower’s overwhelming victory in the presidential election in November 1956, the Democrats continued to dominate Congress. Then, during his second term, the president lost key officials who had helped to formulate or had supported his New Look doctrine.. Gruenther’s decision to retire at the end of November 1956 was in Eisenhower’s words ‘a shocker’.. Humphrey, who Eisenhower had described as ‘mentally qualified for the Presidency’, resigned in May 1957,. followed by Wilson, who resigned after the . shock in October 1957. Despite all his shortcomings Wilson had pressed forward with reductions in defence expenditures to meet the requirements of the New Look. Humphrey’s successor, Robert B. Anderson (a former secretary of the navy and deputy defense secretary) would also be conscientious in his efforts to keep down defence expenditures, while John McElroy, Wilson’s replacement, tried to ameliorate inter-service rivalry, albeit with little success. Radford, an ardent promoter of the New Look, retired in August 1957. His successor, General Twining, was an equally enthusiastic supporter of the New Look, as was Sherman Adams, Eisenhower’s White House chief of staff. However,
|
| 12 |
,Realities Behind the New Look: , and After, |
Saki Dockrill |
|
Abstract
On 4 October 1957, the news that the Soviet Union had successfully launched the world’s first earth satellite, . weighing 184 pounds, took the world by surprise. . boasted that . was the result of ‘the high level of scientific and technical thought in our country’.. Subsequently, on 2 November, the Soviet Union launched ., a much larger satellite, weighing 1100 pounds, which contained a dog called Liska. On 6 December 1957, the American navy’s 3.12 1b Vanguard rocket exploded, in front of the TV cameras, two seconds after take-off. These developments severely shook American confidence in their technological superiority. Indeed, public opinion became almost hysterical about the Soviet achievements, while the US press described the failed Vanguard as ‘Puffnik, Flopnik; Kaputnik or Stayputnik’.. The American intelligence community had suspected for some months that the Soviets possessed ‘the capability of initiating ICBM flight testing’, and . did not surprise the president? However, it did force him to adopt a number of measures which he believed essential if the confidence of the American public and America’s allies in American scientific prowess was to be restored..
|
| 13 |
,Eisenhower’s Final Struggles: Deterrence, Negotiations, and Defence Budgeting, |
Saki Dockrill |
|
Abstract
The Republicans suffered serious losses in the 1958 mid term Congressional election and as a result Eisenhower faced a Democratic-controlled Congress for the third time in a row.. He now had only two years left to defend his New Look. Nelson Rockefeller, now governor of New York, became the Republican representative of the anti-New Look faction, which provided Democrats like senators Stewart Symington, Lyndon Johnson, and John F. Kennedy with welcome allies in their campaign against the ‘missile gap’. Kennedy called for ‘the need for a new approach’ to the national defence, which in Henry Kissinger’s words, was suffering from ‘a Maginot-line mentality’, that is, ‘dependence upon a strategy which may collapse or may never be used’..
|
| 14 |
,Conclusion, |
Saki Dockrill |
|
Abstract
In the aftermath of the Second World War the United States had drastically demobilised its military forces. Such ruthlessness was not possible after the Korean war, as the United States had now become a global super power with the awesome responsibilities which such a role entailed. Moreover, the world was bitterly divided by the intense pressures of the cold war, a highly dangerous and volatile situation in which the US was a key player. This state of ‘no peace, no war’ presented the Eisenhower administration with enormous problems in trying to determine how much of its resources the country was willing and able to devote to military preparations to secure its national security goals. To add to these problems, the United States, which had possessed only a few atomic bombs in the mid- 1940s, was now facing a long period of technological competition — both quantitatively and qualitatively — with the Soviet Union. Finally, while in 1945 the international system had been monopolised by the ‘Big Three’ — the US, USSR, and the United Kingdom — by the time Eisenhower left the White House early in 1961, the international system had been enlarged by the emergence of independent third world
|
| 15 |
Back Matter |
|
|
Abstract
|
书目名称Eisenhower‘s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61影响因子(影响力)
书目名称Eisenhower‘s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61影响因子(影响力)学科排名
书目名称Eisenhower‘s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61网络公开度
书目名称Eisenhower‘s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61网络公开度学科排名
书目名称Eisenhower‘s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61被引频次
书目名称Eisenhower‘s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61被引频次学科排名
书目名称Eisenhower‘s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61年度引用
书目名称Eisenhower‘s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61年度引用学科排名
书目名称Eisenhower‘s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61读者反馈
书目名称Eisenhower‘s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61读者反馈学科排名
|
|
|
发表于 2025-3-21 16:16:09
