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Titlebook: Efficient Auction Games; Theories, Algorithms Zhongjing Ma,Suli Zou Book 2020 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 Divisible resource al

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书目名称Efficient Auction Games
副标题Theories, Algorithms
编辑Zhongjing Ma,Suli Zou
视频video
概述Explores the efficient allocation of divisible resources under different types of auction games.Verifies the performances of the proposed methods using numerical simulations.Discusses extending auctio
图书封面Titlebook: Efficient Auction Games; Theories, Algorithms Zhongjing Ma,Suli Zou Book 2020 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 Divisible resource al
描述.This book focuses on the design of efficient & dynamic methods to allocate divisible resources under various auction mechanisms, discussing their applications in power & microgrid systems and the V2G & EV charging coordination problems in smart grids. It describes the design of dynamic methods for single-sided and double-sided auction games and presents a number of simulation cases verifying the performances of the proposed algorithms in terms of efficiency, convergence and computational complexity. Further, it explores the performances of certain auction mechanisms in a hierarchical structure and with large-scale agents, as well as the auction mechanisms for the efficient allocation of multi-type resources. Lastly, it generalizes the main and demonstrates their application in smart grids.  ..This book is a valuable resource for researchers, engineers, and graduate students in the fields of optimization, game theory, auction mechanisms and smart grids interested indesigning dynamic auction mechanisms to implement optimal allocation of divisible resources, especially electricity and other types of energy in smart grids..
出版日期Book 2020
关键词Divisible resource allocation; Auction mechanism; Auction games; Incentive compatibility; Nash equilibri
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2639-8
isbn_softcover978-981-15-2641-1
isbn_ebook978-981-15-2639-8
copyrightSpringer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020
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Double-Sided Auction Games for Efficient Resource Allocation,dual players in this chapter. Under the auction mechanism with the VCG-type payment, the incentive compatibility holds, and the efficient bid profile is a Nash equilibrium (NE). Different from the single-sided auction in the previous chapter, there exists an infinite number of NEs in the underlying
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Hierarchical Auction Games for Efficient Resource Allocation,amount of resource from a single provider and allocates it to its buyers with auction mechanisms. To implement the efficient allocations for the underlying hierarchical system, we first design an auction mechanism, for each local system composed of a supplier and its buyers, which inherits the advan
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