书目名称 | Economic Sanctions | 副标题 | International Policy | 编辑 | Robert Eyler | 视频video | http://file.papertrans.cn/302/301791/301791.mp4 | 图书封面 |  | 描述 | This book looks at economic sanctions, using a political economy foundation. The author investigates the effectiveness of sanctions and the human suffering caused by them from a political and economic vantage, addressing political decisions, case studies, and game theory explanations, as well as discussing the future of sanctions as statecraft. | 出版日期 | Book 2007 | 关键词 | economics; economy; foundation; game theory; macroeconomics; political economy; science and technology; suc | 版次 | 1 | doi | https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230610002 | isbn_softcover | 978-1-349-53538-5 | isbn_ebook | 978-0-230-61000-2 | copyright | Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Nature America Inc. 2007 |
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Front Matter |
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Abstract
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,To Sanction or Not to Sanction?, |
Robert Eyler |
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Abstract
On June 25, 2006, an Israeli soldier was kidnapped by militants, known as “Hamas,” after a raid into Israel from positions in the Gaza Strip. The soldier was held hostage and his captors’ demands included the freeing of over one thousand jailed Palestinians. As a reaction to this kidnapping, where one soldier’s life was in question, the Israeli government ordered troops over the border into Gaza to destroy bridges and electric transformers and to shut off all utilities to the suspected location of the Hamas kidnappers. The limited invasion sought to constrain the kidnappers’ activity and find the soldier in question, not to initiate full-scale conflict against Hamas in Gaza. On July 5, however, as negotiations closed in on a stalemate, the Israeli army began to mass on the Gaza border for a full strike..
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,Basic Sanction Analysis, |
Robert Eyler |
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Abstract
To study economic statecraft is to study international economics. These policies of economic coercion, to affect political change, are case-specific in their characteristics, involving many nations and cultures. By changing the way a nation consumes, works, and saves, theory suggests economic sanctions can levy a tax on the target’s regime and populace to engage its rulers directly for change. Policy choices transmitting welfare redistributions among the parties involved, and also creating externalities that affect other groups indirectly, are the essence of political economy. In this chapter, basic concepts from international economics are applied to sanctions and some seminal works in the literature are discussed vis-à-vis these basic ideas. This chapter’s literature review is selective and not meant to be comprehensive. Relevant literature is mentioned and discussed throughout this text when topical.
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,Sanction Initiation and Continuance: Enter Game Theory, |
Robert Eyler |
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Abstract
Sanctions act like wars of attrition. The sender attempts to manipulate the target’s wealth and income such that the target acquiesces and give up its prey. Instead of lions fighting over a gazelle in the sub-Saharan plains, the prey is the ability to engage in human rights abuses, aboveground nuclear testing, invasion of a neighbor, technology piracy, and so on. As embargoes continue to be acts of diplomacy, costs mount on both sides and reduce the benefits of respective actions: the deviant behavior of the target and the sender’s economic statecraft. The imposition of sanctions represents a deadweight loss of utility for both nations, providing an incentive to reach an agreement before imposition (Drezner 2003, 644).
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,Public Choice Theory and Smart Sanctions, |
Robert Eyler |
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Abstract
Sanctions are seen throughout the world as blunt diplomatic instruments, potentially causing collateral damage to an innocent populace as a penalty for its government’s actions. This belief is exactly correct. Economic statecraft attempts to influence current or potential disenfranchisement, providing incentives for the target’s people to demand political change. Sanctions simultaneously attempt to influence interest groups within the target economy to rise up, either through a political process or more violently, against the target’s policies or rulers. How much are common citizens hurt by these policies? Is the sender’s populace harmed such that those groups that influence sender decisions pressure for sanction’s end? Do the payoffs to sender interest groups exceed the cost to humanity?
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,Open Economy Macroeconomics and Sanctions, |
Robert Eyler |
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Abstract
One way to combine both the qualitative analyses that have been a constant throughout the sanction canon and quantitative tests of sanction effectiveness is to view sanctions as macroeconomic policy choices, analogous to monetary or fiscal policies. Recent advances in macroeconomics and international finance allow economists to potentially settle issues concerning sanction measurement and tracking sanction effects as for both the sender and target economies. This chapter extends the Obstfeld-Rogoff “Redux” (1995) model to provide a macroeconomic theory of sanctions.. Their model and the extensions that followed became the “New Open Economy Macroeconomics,” called NOEM models from here.
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,Mathematical Derivations of NOEM Sanctions Model, |
Robert Eyler |
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Abstract
This chapter focuses on the equations and derivations discussed in chapter five. New Open Economy Macro (NOEM) models are mathematically intensive and tedious to derive. However, in taking the steps to solve this model, the way sanctions enter and affect the economy is illuminated. Empirical implications of this model are discussed. Any errors or omissions that lead to confusion are my own doing and do not reflect any other author’s work. Table 5A.1 provides a symbol list for the equations in chapters five and five A.
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,Empirical Analyses of Sanction Effectiveness, |
Robert Eyler |
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Abstract
This quote alludes to the challenges in using current data sets on sanctions without some adjustments. Other challenges include an inability to pinpoint what represents economic coercion’s “contribution” to sanction effectiveness. This chapter continues this text’s thesis that economic statecraft is ultimately macroeconomic, because sanctions are initiated as if they were macroeconomic policy. Further, decoupling the economic contribution from the political and humanitarian effects of statecraft reduces the endogenity problem. However, the endogenity problem is difficult to conquer; endogenity in this model reflects reality. Sanction effects are based on feedback loops surging through the target economy to create a political critical mass for change.
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,Conclusions and Policy Recommendations, |
Robert Eyler |
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Abstract
Economic coercion, as an option in international diplomacy, has been in existence since the Megarian Decrees of 435 .. Many historians debate whether these decrees, which acted to prohibit Megarians from using Greek ports or markets, initiated the Peloponnesian War. Current economic powers continuously debate over how to impose sanctions on upstart, rogue nations, remaining somewhat divided on actions and perceived consequences. North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests in 2006 showed the world three key aspects of economic sanctions and statecraft, as the United Nations debates new measures.
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Back Matter |
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Abstract
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