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Titlebook: Dynamic Games in Economics; Josef Haunschmied,Vladimir M. Veliov,Stefan Wrzacz Book 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 Conflict S

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发表于 2025-3-21 18:09:56 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
书目名称Dynamic Games in Economics
编辑Josef Haunschmied,Vladimir M. Veliov,Stefan Wrzacz
视频video
概述Presents recent developments in dynamic game theory.Includes new application of dynamic games to important economic questions.Suggests directions for future research in the field.Includes supplementar
丛书名称Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in Economics and Finance
图书封面Titlebook: Dynamic Games in Economics;  Josef Haunschmied,Vladimir M. Veliov,Stefan Wrzacz Book 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 Conflict S
描述.Dynamic game theory serves the purpose of including strategic interaction in decision making and is therefore often applied to economic problems. This book presents the state-of-the-art and directions for future research in dynamic game theory related to economics. It was initiated by contributors to the 12.th. Viennese Workshop on Optimal Control, Dynamic Games and Nonlinear Dynamics and combines a selection of papers from the workshop with invited papers of high quality..
出版日期Book 2014
关键词Conflict Situations; Dynamic Game Theory; Dynamic Games; Economic Dynamics; Economic Games
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54248-0
isbn_softcover978-3-662-51193-0
isbn_ebook978-3-642-54248-0Series ISSN 1566-0419 Series E-ISSN 2363-8370
issn_series 1566-0419
copyrightSpringer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014
The information of publication is updating

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Dynamic Analysis of an Electoral Campaign,e the socially optimal number of candidates. It appears that the number of candidates maximising the total number of votes on the election day is lower than the number of candidates entering the political game attracted by any non-negative share of consensus.
发表于 2025-3-22 03:47:01 | 显示全部楼层
1566-0419 eory related to economics. It was initiated by contributors to the 12.th. Viennese Workshop on Optimal Control, Dynamic Games and Nonlinear Dynamics and combines a selection of papers from the workshop with invited papers of high quality..978-3-662-51193-0978-3-642-54248-0Series ISSN 1566-0419 Series E-ISSN 2363-8370
发表于 2025-3-22 06:34:54 | 显示全部楼层
Robust Markov Perfect Equilibria in a Dynamic Choice Model with Quasi-hyperbolic Discounting,on time. This requirement, in turn, leads to a non-cooperative infinite horizon stochastic game played by a countably many . representing him during the play. As a result, we provide two existence theorems for a robust Markov perfect equilibrium (.) and discuss its properties.
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Differential Games and Environmental Economics,lution control and the lake game. It will be shown that existing solution techniques can cover some of the gap between non-cooperative Nash equilibria and the cooperative outcome. It will also be shown that the regulation by means of realistic tax rates can cover some of the remaining gap but not all the way.
发表于 2025-3-22 13:45:44 | 显示全部楼层
Chemische und tribologische Eigenschaftenee to which the foreign competitor can absorb these spillovers depends on its absorptive effort. Using numerical methods the properties of a Markov perfect equilibrium of this game are characterized and the implications of the variation of different key parameters are examined.
发表于 2025-3-22 20:27:05 | 显示全部楼层
Chemische und tribologische Eigenschaftene the socially optimal number of candidates. It appears that the number of candidates maximising the total number of votes on the election day is lower than the number of candidates entering the political game attracted by any non-negative share of consensus.
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发表于 2025-3-23 05:38:10 | 显示全部楼层
Chemische und tribologische Eigenschaften procedure” leading to subgame-consistent solutions is derived and an illustration is presented. This is the first time that subgame consistent cooperative provision of public goods with uncertainties in stock dynamics and future payoffs is analyzed.
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