Titlebook: Dynamic Economic Problems with Regime Switches; Josef L. Haunschmied,Raimund M. Kovacevic,Vladimir Book 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland A

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粗糙

Die Dynamik von Konkurrenz und Kooperation selective survey of the analysis of regime shifts from an economic viewpoint, with particular emphasis on the use of the techniques of optimal control theory and differential games. We examine the concepts of regime shifts, thresholds, and tipping points in both deterministic and stochastic setting

使残废

Die Dynamik von Konkurrenz und Kooperation following interesting papers of Boucekkine with different co-authors dealing with the Arab Spring, that elites manage first the ruling and then the transition to a ‘democratic’ government. We are less optimistic concerning the economic efficiency of domestic resource use and, more importantly, exte

上釉彩

Bernadette Gold,Stephan Rietmann model with locally increasing returns to scale possibly generating multiple equilibria paths with finite upper equilibrium. The deterministic dynamics is then overlayed by random dynamics where catastrophic events happen at random points of time. The number of events follows a Poisson process, wher

RAG

Nuance

Nuance

Debility

Bettina Westle,Oskar Niedermayer which do not appear in smooth problems. In this contribution, we explore in detail a differential game with regime switching and spillovers and study the behavior of optimal trajectories both in cooperative and non-cooperative differential game settings. We explicitly derive analytic solutions and

progestin

irreparable

Rechtsextremismus, Sexismus und Gender Gapne of these firms has an option to additionally introduce a new product, thereby incurring costs of product adoption. We assume that the innovator can commit on the time of product introduction and numerically derive the optimal introduction time as well as the associated Markov-perfect equilibria f