Titlebook: Disorganized Crimes; Why Corporate Govern Bernard E. Munk Book 2013 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2013 cor

Extemporize

Connecting the Dots, as part of the agency problem that inevitably arose from the division of decision-making and ownership in the modern corporation. The cure was said to be making managers behave more like equity owners. The device to accomplish this goal was that a significant portion of total managerial compensation should be paid in common stock.

变形词

Micro Risks and Macro Disturbances,he housing bubble.. There is no doubt that the easy credit conditions that followed from the Fed’s fear of deflation during 2001–04 were a huge stimulus to the housing market. Credit is like sunshine. Crops grow in sunshine, but so do weeds.

Insensate

Crime and Punishment,ly to lead to a new challenge even more frightening. As the drama evolved, earlier choices made by key managers seemed totally inexplicable. In hindsight, one could easily argue that managerial actions had been “excessive,” even perhaps “deranged”.

Fantasy

,Who’s the Fish?,il trader in the 1980s, then as a terminal owner and utility fuel supplier, and finally as an energy consultant to a Wall Street investment bank in the 1990s. Along with a number of other companies whose (common) stock had first soared and were later revealed as financial fiascos as the so-called “.

congenial

Behind Every Great Fortune Is a Great Crime,spiratorial nature of the crime and the “cat and mouse” game between the criminals and their police adversaries after the crime has been committed. Many of us even admire the verve of the criminal perpetrators along with the cleverness of the investigators who uncover the clues and (hopefully) bring

搏斗

百科全书

Round Up the Usual Suspects,e lapses inherent consequences of managerial capitalism, or was this just an aberrant period of corporate excess hidden by financial exuberance? How could all the oversight systems fail at the same moment? Is this outcome endemic to absentee ownership and the separation of ownership and control? Is

安装

Carrots for Good Governance,l for corporate misgovernance. This is especially true when boards fail to exercise skillful discipline of management, particularly with regard to risks undertaken by corporate managers. Under these conditions, shareholder property can be placed at risk without the knowledge of shareholders. Corpora

Mobile

The Conflicts of Managerial Capitalism,presented “a few bad apples at the bottom of the barrel.” If few in number, they were quite large in their impact. The “few bad apples” view became increasingly difficult to sustain. Congress didn’t believe it; the media didn’t believe it; and many commentators on corporate governance didn’t believe

coltish

Call Them Disorganized Crimes,l journalists and management scholars was one of broad distrust. That portrait arose from revelations of outright fraud, excessive managerial compensation, a tattered agency relationship between management and the shareholders, and considerable evidence of a conspiracy of silence among major capital