Titlebook: Discrimination in Financial Services; A Special Issue of t George J. Benston,W. Curt Hunter,George G. Kaufman Book 1997 Springer Science+Bu

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PSA-velocity

Massimiliano Pieraccini,Lapo MiccinesiWe find that the noise in evaluating applicant credit risk can have a differential impact on marginal borrowers across racial groups. Consequently, discrimination can go undetected in an examination of relative loan denial rates when it is present. We also show that discrimination can be “detected”

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13810-2nt interventions on the supply side of the housing market. Although many studies of low-income lending at the neighborhood level have been published, none is from the firm’s perspective. We adopt such a framework to test the twin propositions that the low-income mortgage market is no different from

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Massimiliano Pieraccini,Lapo Miccinesisuggest that black-owned banks may utilize applicant race in the mortgage granting decision. The result holds in a naive HMDA model and in an enhanced HMDA model with bank-specific, demographic, and neighborhood characteristics added.

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Sustainable Construction Materialss and discrimination against areas with high concentrations of minority residents. The existence of the latter type of discrimination originally was raised by statistics showing lower home loan mortgage origination rates in minority-concentrated areas; the former, by those showing that mortgage loan

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Rosemary K. Thomas,M. Helen Santhi of the greenlining coalition, whose existence is based on the belief that banks discriminate against neighborhoods by refusing to make conventional mortgage loans on properties located there. At the outset, I want to point out that the race of potential mortgagors was not considered in the initial

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interference

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Community Mental Health Resourcingof noneconomic borrower characteristics. We evaluate situations in which banks may find it in their self interest to respond to regulation in a strategic manner intended to improve public relations and appease regulators rather than to adhere to the true spirit of the regulation. We find some evidence consistent with such behavior.