Titlebook: Deontic Logic and Artificial Normative Systems; 8th International Wo Lou Goble,John-Jules Ch. Meyer Conference proceedings 2006 Springer-Ve

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-40303-7at ought to be done in a particular situation, with moral norms perhaps emerging from this reasoning. We model this situated reasoning drawing on our previous work on argumentation schemes, here set in the context of Action-Based Alternating Transition Systems. We distinguish what prudentially ought

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Walter Modell (Associate Professor)ations corresponding to the functionality of logical components. We illustrate how the architectural approach can be used to develop a logic of a normative system based on logics of counts-as conditionals, institutional constraints, obligations and permissions. In this example we adapt for counts-as

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-40303-7les us to model several concepts discussed in the deontic logic literature. Among the issues discussed are: conditionality, ought implies can, deliberateness, settledness, achievement obligations versus maintenance obligations and deontic detachment. We motivate our framework by arguing for the impo

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Walter Modell (Associate Professor)n of it. Then, we study the interaction between the temporal dimension and the deontic dimension. We present some logical properties, concerning formulas where deontic and temporal operators are nested, and discuss their intuitive meaning. We focus more particularly on the properties of obligation w

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Walter Modell (Associate Professor)often one has duties of longer durations such as: “Never do that”, or “Do this someday”. In this paper, we will investigate how to amend ... so that such long-term duties can be expressed. This leads to the interesting and suprising consequence that the long-term prohibition and obligation are not i

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Walter Modell (Associate Professor)ype of normative modality. It is then argued that, in terms of inferencing related to this modality, a solution can be given to the task J. L. Austin set but failed to resolve: finding a criterion for distinguishing between what Austin called . and . The remainder of the paper indicates the importan