| 书目名称 | Democratic Governance and Economic Performance | | 副标题 | How Accountability C | | 编辑 | Dino Falaschetti | | 视频video | | | 概述 | Challenges conventional wisdom about the benefits of democratic governance in organizations.Provides evidence how “democracy can go too far” and thus decrease economic performance.Applies theory to ma | | 丛书名称 | Studies in Public Choice | | 图书封面 |  | | 描述 | .Conventional wisdom warns that unaccountable political and business agents can enrich a few at the expense of many. But logically extending this wisdom implies that associated principals – voters, consumers, shareholders – will favor themselves over the greater good when ‘rules of the game’ instead create too much accountability. Democratic Governance and Economic Performance rigorously develops this hypothesis, and finds statistical evidence and case study illustrations that democratic institutions at various governance levels (e.g., federal, state, corporation) have facilitated opportunistic gains for electoral, consumer, and shareholder principals. To be sure, this conclusion does not dismiss the potential for democratic governance to productively reduce agency costs. Rather, it suggests that policy makers, lawyers, and managers can improve governance by weighing the agency benefits of increased accountability against the distributional costs of favoring principal stakeholders over more general economic opportunities. Carefully considering the fundamentals that give rise to this tradeoff should interest students and scholars working at the intersection of social science and the | | 出版日期 | Book 2009 | | 关键词 | Business organization; Competition law; Corporate governance; Democracy; Distribution versus efficiency; | | 版次 | 1 | | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-78707-7 | | isbn_softcover | 978-1-4614-1721-7 | | isbn_ebook | 978-0-387-78707-7Series ISSN 0924-4700 Series E-ISSN 2731-5258 | | issn_series | 0924-4700 | | copyright | Springer-Verlag New York 2009 |
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发表于 2025-3-21 19:09:37
