Titlebook: Decisions, Games and Markets; Pierpaolo Battigalli,Aldo Montesano,Fausto Panunzi Book 1997 Springer Science+Business Media New York 1997 d

颂扬国家

Decentralization, Mobility Costs and the Soft Budget Constraintproblems. In our framework, the State is in charge of the decision of refinancing a loss-making “strategic” enterprise in a centralized setting. In a decentralized setting, the region where the firm is located takes the decision of whether to continue or stop the activity of the unprofitable firm. H

孵卵器

Equivalence and Duality Between the Sets of Pareto-Maximal Allocations and the Sets of Maximal Distr utilities. This paper provides the global characterization of efficient allocations by means of the sets of Pareto—maximal allocations and the sets of maximal distributable surplus allocations..These sets are defined both with respect to given resources and with respect to given utilities. Equivale

巧办法

Economic Models of Social Learningsed. We present and discuss some models of Bayesian social learning which recently appeared in the economics literature. We focus on the problems of information acquisition, stationarity of the environment and endogenous pricing, and we propose some applications.

气候

Market Size, the Informational Content of Stock Prices and Risk: A Multiasset Model and Some Evidenc future dividends. This paper analyzes the relationship between market size and risk in a rational expectations equilibrium model with many assets and transaction costs. It predicts that (i) the conditional and unconditional variance of stock returns is higher for thin stocks, and (ii) this relation

evaculate

paragon

jumble

庄严

GEN

Decentralization, Mobility Costs and the Soft Budget Constraintnclusions. First, decentralization achieves a hard budget constraint only if immigration is harmful to the welfare of the recipient region; otherwise, centralization is preferable..Second, low mobility costs are a necessary condition for decentralization to contribute harden the firm’s budget constr

hardheaded

Andreas Føllesdal,Peter Koslowskion a given set of outcomes are common knowledge, we show for a restricted class of games that players’ maximally rational strategies coincide with the strategies that survive the iterated deletion of strategies which are dominated by . strategies.