Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 14th International C Jie Fu,Tomas Kroupa,Yezekael Hayel Conference proceedings 2023 The Editor(s) (i

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Asymmetric Centrality Game Against Network Epidemic Propagatione of devices may vary due to factors such as variations in roles, information accessibility, available resources, and diverse viewpoints on risks, issues, or opportunities [.]. Consequently, the agents involved in the process may hold different views regarding the significance of devices, resulting

Halfhearted

Hallowed

Characterizing and Improving the Robustness of Predict-Then-Optimize Frameworkst be .. We then bound the loss of decision quality in the presence of adversarial label drift to show there may exist a strict gap between the performance of the two algorithms. We verify our theoretical findings empirically in two asymmetric and two symmetric settings. These experimental results de

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Scalable Learning of Intrusion Response Through Recursive Decompositionecomposed game we introduce an algorithm called Decompositional Fictitious Self-Play (.), which learns Nash equilibria through stochastic approximation. We evaluate the learned strategies in an emulation environment where real intrusions and response actions can be executed. The results show that th

NEG

Honeypot Allocation for Cyber Deception in Dynamic Tactical Networks: A Game Theoretic Approachcost associated with deception and reconfiguration due to changes in network topology. We present an iterative algorithm to find Nash equilibrium strategies and analyze the scalability of the algorithm. Finally, we validate our approach and present numerical results based on simulations, demonstrati

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Optimal Resource Allocation for Proactive Defense with Deception in Probabilistic Attack Graphsattackers. We show the problem against a rational attacker can be formulated as a bi-level linear program. For attackers with bounded rationality, we show that under certain assumptions, the problem can be transformed into a constrained optimization problem. We proposed an algorithm to approximately

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The Credential is Not Enough: Deception with Honeypots and Fake Credentialsreferences by observing the attacker’s actions, we enrich both parties’ action spaces by allowing the attacker to query whether a server is real or honeypot and by allowing the defender to choose between honeypots that better reveal attacker behavior, or honeypots that exploit current knowledge of a

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Playing Repeated Coopetitive Polymatrix Games with Small Manipulation Cost agent that provably guarantees that the utility of any opponent would converge to a value we desire. We then use this scheme to design winning policies for our agent. We also prove that these winning policies can be found in polynomial running time. We then turn to demonstrate the efficiency of our

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