Titlebook: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -- CHES 2003; 5th International Wo Colin D. Walter,Çetin K. Koç,Christof Paar Conference procee

NEEDY

誓言

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8814-0 Input Driven Hidden Markov Models (IDHMM’s), a generalization of HMM’s that provides a powerful and unified cryptanalytic framework for analyzing countermeasures whose operational behavior can be modeled by a probabilistic finite state machine. IDHMM’s generalize previous cryptanalyses of randomize

调色板

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8814-0ithms, not only the speed and the size of the circuit are important, but also their security against implementation attacks such as side-channel attacks. Power-analysis attacks are typical examples of side-channel attacks, that have been demonstrated to be effective against implementations without s

Headstrong

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8814-0ey issue in the design of these devices is the question whether the required hardware fits onto a single wafer when dealing with cryprographically relevant parameters..We describe a modification of these devices which distributes the technologically challenging single wafer design onto separate part

foodstuff

ASSET

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8814-0rtexts. The fault model used is realistic, as we consider random faults affecting bytes (faults affecting one only bit are much harder to induce). We implemented our attack on a PC for both the AES and .. We are able to break the AES-128 with only 2 faulty ciphertexts, assuming the fault occurs betw

ATOPY

能够支付

Talkative

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8814-0ms. In this paper we will describe parity code based concurrent error detection (CED) approach against such attacks in substitution-permutation network (SPN) symmetric block ciphers [22]. The basic idea compares a carefully modified parity of the input plain text with that of the output cipher text

愚笨

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8814-0gates with a power consumption, which is independent of the data signals, and therefore the technique removes the foundation for DPA. In a design experiment, a fundamental component of the DES algorithm has been implemented. Detailed transistor level simulations show a perfect security whenever the