书目名称 | Credible Threats in Negotiations | 副标题 | A Game-theoretic App | 编辑 | Harold Houba,Wilko Bolt | 视频video | http://file.papertrans.cn/240/239624/239624.mp4 | 丛书名称 | Theory and Decision Library C | 图书封面 |  | 描述 | The game-theoretic modelling of negotiations has been an active research area for the past five decades, that started with the seminal work by Nobel laureate John Nash in the early 1950s. This book provides a survey of some of the major developments in the field of strategic bargaining models with an emphasize on the role of threats in the negotiation process. Threats are all actions outside the negotiation room that negotiators have ate their disposal and the use of these actions affect the bargaining position of all negotiators. Of course, each negotiator aims to strengthen his own position. Examples of threats are the announcement of a strike by a union in centralized wage bargaining, or a nation’s announcement of a trade war directed against other nations in negotiations for trade liberalization. This book is organized on the basis of a simple guiding principle: The situation in which none of the parties involved in the negotiations has threats at its disposal is the natural benchmark for negotiations where the parties can make threats. Also on the technical level, negotiations with variable threats build on and extend the techniques applied in analyzing bargaining situations w | 出版日期 | Book 2002 | 关键词 | bargaining; diversity; economic theory; negotiations; research | 版次 | 1 | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/b109097 | isbn_softcover | 978-1-4419-5304-9 | isbn_ebook | 978-0-306-47539-9Series ISSN 0924-6126 Series E-ISSN 2194-3044 | issn_series | 0924-6126 | copyright | Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2002 |
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