Titlebook: Covenants and Third-Party Creditors; Empirical and Law & Daniela Matri Book 2017 Springer International Publishing AG 2017 Covenants.Credi

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shown. Afterwards, the specific potential externalities of the bilateral governance system will be presented. This part will systematise the theoretical considerations in the literature to allow for an overall assessment. It will be completed by the subsequent chapter, which will establish the gene

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ata will be discussed. Finally, the feasibility of positive and negative externalities will be deduced. Overall, the chapter will show that the scale of positive and negative effects mainly depends on the bank’s conduct after a covenant default.

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research into the effects on third-party creditors, however, has so far been insufficient. The work therefore tackled this task by first systematising potential externalities of covenants and then empirically testing the presumptions about the bank’s conduct after a covenant default. In that way, th

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CPR private governance structure looses its “teeth”. This will lead to a lower level of protection for all creditors as well as to a shift of control in corporate governance towards short-term stakeholders. Thus, future research in the area of bank regulation must consider its interrelationship wit

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Outlook CPR private governance structure looses its “teeth”. This will lead to a lower level of protection for all creditors as well as to a shift of control in corporate governance towards short-term stakeholders. Thus, future research in the area of bank regulation must consider its interrelationship wit

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Book 2017d value of the debtor company’s asset pool (as CPR) exists an n-person prisoner’s dilemma between banks and third-party creditors: No creditor knows when and under what conditions the other creditor will appropriate funds from the debtor company’s asset pool. This coordination problem is traditional