Titlebook: Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns; Empirical Evidence f Andreas Schillhofer Book 2003 Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag/GWV Fachv

吞食

书目名称Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns影响因子(影响力)




书目名称Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns影响因子(影响力)学科排名




书目名称Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns网络公开度




书目名称Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns网络公开度学科排名




书目名称Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns被引频次




书目名称Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns被引频次学科排名




书目名称Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns年度引用




书目名称Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns年度引用学科排名




书目名称Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns读者反馈




书目名称Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns读者反馈学科排名

芳香一点

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework, on Corporate Governance. It builds on the property rights theory, since it deals with the delegation of control rights from the principal to the agent. The principal-agent relationship can be defined as “[...] a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the

orthopedist

Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance,hanisms. or into exante preventive and ex-post corrective control mechanisms.. The classification into internal and external mechanisms refers to whether the respective mechanism is initiated and conducted through internal institutionalized channels and procedures or through external parties beyond

翅膀拍动

充足

obstinate

obstinate

Mingxin Zhang,Qiuyu Wu,Yongjun Liu on Corporate Governance. It builds on the property rights theory, since it deals with the delegation of control rights from the principal to the agent. The principal-agent relationship can be defined as “[...] a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the

歌剧等

Guojun Wang,Xuemin Lin,Genggeng Liuhanisms. or into exante preventive and ex-post corrective control mechanisms.. The classification into internal and external mechanisms refers to whether the respective mechanism is initiated and conducted through internal institutionalized channels and procedures or through external parties beyond

byline

Bin Xu,Sheng Yan,Kening Gao,Yu Zhang,Ge Yud induced agency costs and increase firm value. While there are a number of studies which analyze the relationship between Corporate Governance and firm value, the link between Governance mechanisms and the required rate of return is largely unexplored. Lombardo and Pagano (2002) argue that this is

GUEER

Xin Wang,Rui Zhang,Yang-Sae Moonthey are willing to pay significant premiums for well-governed companies, and that Corporate Governance practices are at least important as financial indicators when evaluating investment decisions. While the relationship between legal Governance variables and firm performance has been analyzed in n