Titlebook: Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations; Holger I. Meinhardt Book 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002 bifurcation.co

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Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations978-3-642-56136-8Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957

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Common Pool Resources, common properties with face-to-face communication between egoists, it seems on the basis of empirical studies that Cooperation is an essential feature to exploit a natural exhaustible resource. Since the appearance of the articles of Gordon (1954) and Hardin (1968) an extensive theoretical literatu

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The Common Pool Game,longs to the core. This can also be understood that core allocation can be stabilized by pronouncing threats and counter threats. Moreover, for a nonempty core there exist incentives for cooperative behavior while exhausting the gains that are feasible through mutual Cooperation. Therefore, by worki

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Convexity of Symmetrical TU-CPR Games,a heavy dryness that Cooperation does not break down by using jointly a ground-water basin for irrigation purpose (cf. (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 69–82)). More formally spoken, can we expect that the core remains nonempty after small perturbations? This is in general true for convex games, since it is well

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Concluding Remarks and Outlook on Future Research,pecially, we have shown core existence for α . and β-common-pool TU games. These core existence results have provided us with a first indication concerning the incentives for collective decision making in common pool situations. In a second step we have derived the convexity result for a large dass

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0075-8442 ity results provide us with a theoretical explanation to bridge the gap between the observation in field studies for cooperation and the noncooperative prediction that the common pool resource will be overused and perhaps endangered.978-3-540-43295-1978-3-642-56136-8Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957