Titlebook: Contract Theory in Continuous-Time Models; Jakša Cvitanić,Jianfeng Zhang Book 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013 91G80, 93E20.for

annexation

Linear Models with Project Selection, and Preview of Resultsut to the agent for a random “benchmark” amount, and/or as a possibly nonlinear function of the final value of the output. It is not necessary that the agent’s actions are observed. Only the final value of the output and, possibly, the final value of the underlying risk process (Brownian motion) need to be observed.

全等

Adverse Selectionnd on the underlying source of risk. With risk-neutral agent and principal, a range of lower type agents gets non-incentive cash contracts. As the cost of the effort gets higher, the non-incentive range gets wider, and only the highest type agents get informational rent. The rent gets smaller with higher values of cost, as do the incentives.

万灵丹

CBC471

Subclinical Retinal Detachment,rst best case, or risk sharing, in which both parties have the same information; (ii) the second best case, or moral hazard, in which the action of the agent is hidden or not contractable; (iii) the third best case or adverse selection, in which the type of the agent is hidden.

peritonitis

遭遇

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-34374-5f the underlying SDEs. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived in terms of the so-called adjoint processes and corresponding Forward-Backward SDEs. These processes typically include the output process, the agent’s expected utility process, the principal’s expected utility process, and the ratio of marginal utilities process.

浪荡子

Dri727

尽忠