Titlebook: Contingent A Priori Truths; Metaphysics, Semanti Marco Ruffino Book 2022 Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 Contingent a Priori Truths.Do

Irascible

SNEER

Global Conclusions: The Varieties of Contingent A Priori Truths, normally recognized in the literature concerned with contingent a priori truths.) Moreover, if the perspective presented in the book is correct, contingent a priori truths can be seen as much more pervasive in our cognitive lives than most commentators have supposed.

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说笑

,The Starting Point: Kripke’s “Magic”,ow scope. I also point out what I take to be two serious limitations of Kripke’s account, one of them related to the lack of specification concerning the truth-makers of contingent a priori truths, and the other concerning the prospects for extending the possibility of knowing such truths to other people besides the stipulator.

ADJ

Donnellan and the Acquaintance Requirement,ft open by Donnellan which, curiously, suggests a treatment of Kripke’s cases of contingent a priori truths along the lines that I propose in Chap. . of the book (i.e., as the product of a special kind of illocutionary act).

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0166-6991 ingent a priori truths.Features a new approach to Kripke’s c.This monograph offers a comprehensive study of contingent a priori truths. Building onto a theoretical framework developed by the philosopher and logician Saul Kripke, the author also presents a new approach to these truths...The first par

Liberate

观点

Existence and Uniqueness Resultss, the distinction is not clearly motivated, besides employing a misleading terminology. Moreover, I argue that Evans’ application of his distinction to Kripke’s cases relies on a questionable separation between cognitive content and modal profile of a proposition.

空洞

Approximations of Variational Inequalitiesogic of Demonstratives (what I call . sentences) that can see them as cases of deeply contingent truths. I discuss the possibility of extending Kaplan’s conceptual apparatus to Williamson’s case, and to BonJour’s defense of the inductive principle as a priori.