Titlebook: Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design; 12th International W Shivam Bhasin,Fabrizio De Santis Conference proceedings 2021 Spr

inveigh

C. Nichtgebietsbezogene Sonderleistungen,ng process, such as the NIST Lightweight Cryptography finalist ISAP. In a recent work of Kannwischer et al., it was suggested to mitigate such single-trace attacks with masking and shuffling. In this work, we first show that combining masking and re-keying is conceptually useless since this combinat

保守党

The Visions of an Accelerating Observer,cker. While this field enjoys a significant interest from researchers, a large majority of works focus on block ciphers, and asymmetric cryptography has been very little studied to date. This is in contrast with actual needs and usages by the industry. Indeed, most commercial white-box solutions off

Odyssey

Chang-Bae Moon,HyunSoo Kim,Byeong Man Kim of the operands has coefficients close to 0. We focus on this structure since it is at the core of lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanisms submitted to the NIST call for post-quantum cryptography. In particular, we propose optimization of this operation for embedded devices by using a RSA/ECC co

BIPED

,Bibliographie Jakob v. Uexkülls, relies on a secret elliptic curve scalar multiplication which involves a loop of a double-and-add procedure, of which each iteration depends on a single bit of the private key. The attack therefore exploits the nature of elliptic curve point addition formulas which require the same function to be e

ROOF

面包屑

Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design978-3-030-89915-8Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349

百科全书

SideLine: How Delay-Lines (May) Leak Secrets from Your SoCntrolling hardware resources such as power or clock management from the software, developers earn the possibility to build more flexible and power efficient applications. Despite the benefits, these hardware components are now exposed to software code and can potentially be misused as open-doors to

PON

First Full-Fledged Side Channel Attack on HMAC-SHA-2target if some of their inputs are secret. HMAC is an important use case of a hash function, in which the input is partially secret and thus unknown to the attacker. Despite a few publications that discuss applications of power analysis techniques to attack HMAC-SHA-2, no generic method that shows a

visceral-fat

Learning When to Stop: A Mutual Information Approach to Prevent Overfitting in Profiled Side-Channelwork hyperparameters that would result in top-performing attacks. The hyperparameter leading the training process is the number of epochs during which the training happens. If the training is too short, the network does not reach its full capacity, while if the training is too long, the network over

TIGER

Without , is not Sufficient for SIFA and FTA Security: A Case Studyost all existing FA countermeasures, even while they are combined with Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) countermeasures such as masking. Protecting against these attacks requires an entirely new class of mechanisms, and only a handful of suggestions have been made in the context of SIFA so far. Recently,