Titlebook: Construction and Analysis of Safe, Secure, and Interoperable Smart Devices; International Worksh Gilles Barthe,Lilian Burdy,Traian Muntean

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做方舟

Zusammenfassung, Kritik und Ausblick,namic checks in the Java Card Virtual Machine. This paper describes a refined type system for Java Card that enables static checking of applet isolation. With this type system, firewall violations are detected at compile time. Only a special kind of downcast requires dynamic checks.

modifier

Zusammenfassung, Kritik und Ausblick,ification of . programs considerably more difficult, because they cannot be formalised in a logic based on pre- and postconditions. The KeY system includes an interactive theorem prover for . source code that models the full . standard including transactions. Based on a case study of realistic size

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激怒某人

Geschichte der Unterdruck-Flotation, environments are two among a lot of challenging issues. Next generation smart cards, so-called smart devices, are regarded as personal devices providing a secured execution and storage environment for application tasks and sensitive privacy information, respectively. Hardware evolution of smart dev

河流

CLAN

Diskussion der Versuchsergebnisse,he establish safety properties on it. After the first design step, we automatically translate the synthesizable VHDL into a functional form. The combination of symbolic simulation, automatic transfer function extraction, and theorem proving is used to show that the VHDL design is functionally compli

小臼

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-99153-9n computing devices, next generation cards will consist in embedded Java micro-server platforms. Those platforms will be able to serve various types of services and applications thanks to two important system features: adaptability and maintainability. Two features that have to be carefully taken in

心胸狭窄

温室

History-Based Access Control and Secure Information Flow,ypes dependent on permission state. We also show that in contrast to stack inspection, confidential information can be leaked by the history-based access control mechanism itself. The analysis ensures a noninterference property formalizing confidentiality.