Titlebook: Coalition Formation and Social Choice; M. A. Deemen Book 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1997 conflict.game theory.social c

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J. Grulich-Henn,U. Heinrich,M. Bettendorf Blair and Pollack (1982), and Sen (1970, 1977, 1986). Sen (1977, 1986) called this format the relational approach, which he distinguishes from the functional approach (Kelly 1978, 1988; Fishburn 1973, Suzumura 1983).

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Securitization and Compliance in Aid Work,ackages of properties these aggregation procedures may satisfy. We have also studied particular aggregation procedures like the system of majority decision. In this chapter social choice processes are studied from another perspective. As indicated in the introductory chapter, the essence of politics

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Coalition Formation in Simple Games,ackages of properties these aggregation procedures may satisfy. We have also studied particular aggregation procedures like the system of majority decision. In this chapter social choice processes are studied from another perspective. As indicated in the introductory chapter, the essence of politics

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Coalition Preferences,cts of this chapter are two theories in which the formation of individual preferences with respect to winning coalitions is explicated. Each of these theories leads to a preference profile concerning a set of winning coalitions. Both theories show how these coalition preferences can be used to obtai