Titlebook: Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-51; Ilan Pappé Book 1993 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1993 b

Monolithic

Book 1993Britain‘s Middle East policy was a function of two main features: Britain‘s close alliance with Transjordan; and its pragmatic adaptability to developments in the area. Based on primary sources made available only recently in British, Israeli and American archives, the book offers new insights into a policy which was to have far reaching-effects.

圆柱

Financial Management and Qualityalilee, including the town of Nazareth. This campaign was the last Syrian effort in the war; it resulted in a complete Syrian defeat. The other Arab forces which took part in the fighting, namely Al-Qawqji’s forces and the Syrian and Lebanese armies, were driven out of Palestine.’

万神殿

Managing the New Public Servicesas allotted to the Arab Palestinians by the UN November 1947 resolution. In many ways this understanding determined the outcome of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. It also enabled the Foreign Office to predict the course of that war correctly.

浪费物质

DOLT

腐蚀

The Emergence of the Transjordan Option,d have favoured the Arabs and antagonised the Zionists. It seems, however, that what the British chose to do was done not in order to satisfy either side, but rather in accordance with purely British interests.

esoteric

不满分子

https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137534149 could have (and some would argue, should have) cooperated in enforcing the resolution on behalf of the UN, or at least could have facilitated the transition of Mandatory Palestine to its two successors, the Jewish and the Arab communities. Alternatively, the British government could have chosen to

粉笔

,1982 – 1984: The Manager as Scapegoat,ne, they would not ultimately enter into war. The inability to understand precisely what was going on at the Arab summits contributed to the doubts concerning the seriousness of the Arab leaders’ intentions to invade Palestine. Only on 8 May was the Foreign Office confident that an Arab offensive wo

NOMAD

Financial Management and Qualityome of this Arab initiative. When the fighting was resumed on 9 July, the Arabs were unsuccessful everywhere. In fact, in a matter of a few days (9–19 July) they had lost most of central and northern Palestine. A well-equipped Israeli army succeeded in capturing large Arab areas, mainly in western G