Titlebook: Belief, Evidence, and Uncertainty; Problems of Epistemi Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay,Gordon Brittan Jr.,Mark Book 2016 The Author(s) 2016 Bay

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Concluding Reflectionsdiscuss an application of the confirmation/evidence distinction to an important problem in current ecological research and in the process suggest ways of settling some outstanding problems at the intersection of statistics and the philosophy of science.

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-84572-6tions between “data” and “evidence”, and between different ways in which the concept of “probability” is to be interpreted. An Appendix explains how our likelihoodist account of evidence deals with composite hypotheses.

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-94435-1dentified by Kahneman and Tversky which leads most of us to make mistaken statistical inferences. It is also in the background, or so we argue in some detail, of the important policy controversies concerning human-induced global warming.

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Bayesian and Evidential Paradigmstions between “data” and “evidence”, and between different ways in which the concept of “probability” is to be interpreted. An Appendix explains how our likelihoodist account of evidence deals with composite hypotheses.

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Book 2016erstanding of personal and scientific epistemologies. It outlines a probabilistic framework in which subjective features of personal knowledge and objective features of public knowledge have their true place. It also discusses the bearings of some statistical theorems on both formal and traditional

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Introductory Remarks—Inferential Uncertaintye than probable/likely. Intuitively, even obviously, some claims are more probable/likely than others. Everyone agrees that scientific claims in particular are probable/likely to the extent that they are confirmed by experimental evidence. But there is very little agreement about what “confirmation

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Confirmation and Evidence Distinguisheda hypothesis may be weakly confirmed and yet the evidence for it can be strong, and conversely, the evidence may be weak and the confirmation strong. At first glance, this seems puzzling; the puzzlement disappears once it is understood that confirmation is of single hypotheses, in which there is an

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