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Titlebook: Axiomatic Models of Bargaining; Alvin E. Roth Book 1979 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1979 bargaining.cooperative games.evaluation.uti

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楼主: Ferret
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Humanistic Psychology as a Protest Movementn one participant but fewer than n, these coalitions cannot by themselves secure any outcome but the disagreement outcome; i.e., they cannot secure any outcome which is not available to their members acting individually. So the effect of intermediate coalitions on the bargaining process is of generally minor importance.
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The Formal Model and Axiomatic Derivationn one participant but fewer than n, these coalitions cannot by themselves secure any outcome but the disagreement outcome; i.e., they cannot secure any outcome which is not available to their members acting individually. So the effect of intermediate coalitions on the bargaining process is of generally minor importance.
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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51570-5bargaining; cooperative games; evaluation; utility; value-at-risk
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Probabilistic ModelsIn the previous section we derived Nash’s solution to the bargaining problem axiomatically, by specifying some of its properties. In this section, we consider some models which yield Nash’s solution from other considerations.
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Risk Posturecular bargains which might yield those utilities. This permitted us to summarize in a concise way each player’s preferences over all possible bargains, including those which might involve chance events (i.e., lotteries), without explicitly considering those lotteries.
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Humanistic Psychology as a Protest Movementr by the individual participants acting alone, the special case of bargaining among two participants shares many of the properties of the general case of bargaining among n participants, for n ≥ 2. That is, even when n is greater than two, so that intermediate coalitions exist which contain more tha
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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-1071-6cular bargains which might yield those utilities. This permitted us to summarize in a concise way each player’s preferences over all possible bargains, including those which might involve chance events (i.e., lotteries), without explicitly considering those lotteries.
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