Titlebook: ;

否认

,Primacy in Sight: FDR and the Transition from Neutrality to a “New Deal” for the World,of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian opinion in both the Congress, and the public at large, and his recognition of the United States’ global interests. That the shape of FDR’s ultimate vision for the post-1945 world blended the key assumptions and insights of the two extroverted political cultures of stat

fluoroscopy

Primacy in the Pursuit of National Security: American Grand Strategy from Truman to Johnson,gy adjustment during the Cold War. These debates were from 1945 onward ultimately about the means and not the ends of American grand strategy and demonstrated the manner in which the political cultures of statecraft acted as permissive filters to make certain strategic choices more likely than other

CLOWN

,Primacy in Peril: American Grand Strategy Under Détente, geopolitically and militarily and establishing a new equilibrium that protected the country’s international position. As such it shared much with George F. Kennan’s original formulation of “containment” through its preeminent focus on US–Soviet relations, a “strong point” defence of American intere

corporate

,Primacy in Superpower Confrontation: From Détente to “Peace Through Strength”,bal inequality as key drivers of international politics. Ronald Reagan’s approach to American grand strategy, in turn, was a reaction to the perceived errors of détente and the failure of the Carter administration to harness its quest for a moral foreign policy to the pursuit of American strategic a

多嘴

,Primacy in the Service of (Inter)national Security: The Promises and Pitfalls of the “Unipolar Momes an congenial to our interests”. While the events of 9/11 served to intensify the George W. Bush administration’s pursuit of primacy, the precise shape of that strategy was clearly informed by an aspect of domestic political culture: the influence of the Wilsonian and Jacksonian political cultures

性别

overrule

持久

Collision

rican national security. The chapter then concludes by providing a synthesis of the book’s major arguments and explores a number of potential lessons for the future of American grand strategy drawn from the “long view” of its development and evolution undertaken in the book’s preceding chapters.

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