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Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 14th International S Ioannis Caragiannis,Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen Conference proceedings 2021 Springer Nature Sw

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Pure Nash Equilibria in a Generalization of Congestion Games Allowing Resource Failuresngestion games, and like these, have exact potential functions that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE). We prove that the agent’s cost functions for these games can be hard to compute by giving an example of a game for which the cost function is hard for Valiant’s . class, even in
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Optimal Revenue Guarantees for Pricing in Large Markets a central object of study in the last decade. We consider a basic setting where the buyers’ valuations are independent and identically distributed and there is a single unit on sale. It is well-known that this setting is equivalent to the so-called i.i.d. prophet inequality, for which optimal guara
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Der Aufbau der Zweistofflegierungen better approximate solutions. However, the new distributed algorithm for approximate Nash equilibrium by Czumaj et al. performs consistently at the same bound of 0.3393. This proves our lower bound instances generated against the TS algorithm can serve as a benchmark in design and analysis of appro
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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-26461-4gents that give them high guarantees, independent of the strategies taken by others. In particular, for random tie-breaking, every agent can guarantee herself at least . of the highest reward, and at least . of the optimal social welfare. For ranked tie-breaking, the .th ranked agent can guarantee h
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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-26461-4e of interest is the sum of the individual Lipschitz parameters. Finally, we provide an exponential lower bound on the . query complexity of finding .-approximate . equilibria of .-player, .-action, .-Lipschitz games for strong values of ., motivating the consideration of explicitly randomized algor
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Der Aufbau des Mörtels und des Betons be .-complete even if ., ., and . is either a complete bipartite graph (in fact ., i.e., partitions of size 2 and .) or a complete graph. Moreover, recently we and Bentert et al. [WG 2021], independently, showed that the problem is NP-hard for paths. This means that the search for . algorithms need
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