Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 11th International S Xiaotie Deng Conference proceedings 2018 Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018 Agents.Auction.C

箴言

The Complexity of Cake Cutting with Unequal Shares,eous and divisible resource, the cake, among . players who value pieces according to their own measure function. The goal is to assign each player a not necessarily connected part of the cake that the player evaluates at least as much as her proportional share..In this paper, we investigate the prob

松驰

A Near Optimal Mechanism for Energy Aware Scheduling,mportant question is how the operator of a server should deal with combining energy-efficiency and the particular interests of the users. Consider a cloud server, where clients/agents can submit jobs for processing. The quality of service that each agent perceives is given by a non-decreasing functi

STALE

cylinder

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容易做

COLIC

向外

A Truthful Mechanism for Interval Scheduling,ier completion times. In our model, completing a job provides a benefit equal to its present value, i.e., the value discounted to the time when the job finishes. Users submit job requirements to the cloud provider who non-preemptively schedules jobs to maximize the social welfare, i.e., the sum of p

EWER

On Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms Assuming Convex Costs,tance, in procurement auctions for energy, and when bidders borrow money at non-linear interest rates. We provide a 1 / 16. approximation guarantee for a prior-free randomized mechanism when bidders’ values are drawn from MHR distributions, and their costs are polynomial. Additionally, we propose tw

peptic-ulcer