Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 6th International Sy Berthold Vöcking Conference proceedings 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013 advertise

Anthropoid

蚊子

Congestion Games with Player-Specific Costs Revisited the maximal sets of cost functions that guarantee the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium..For the case that the players are unweighted, we show that it is necessary and sufficient that for every resource and for every pair of players the corresponding cost functions are affine transformations of

袭击

搜寻

Anti-coordination Games and Stable Graph Coloringsively, strictly stable colorings in graphs. We characterize the cases when such colorings exist and when the decision problem is NP-hard. These correspond to finding pure strategy equilibria in the anti-coordination games, whose price of anarchy we also analyze. We further consider the directed case

Ataxia

foppish

招人嫉妒

insurrection

Dividing Connected Chores Fairlyin social welfare due to fairness. Previous work has been done on this so-called price of fairness, concerning fair division of cakes and chores with non-connected pieces and of cakes with connected pieces. We provide tight or nearly tight bounds on the price of fairness in situations where each pla

exophthalmos

On Popular Random Assignmentsdual preferences. An assignment is called popular if there is no other assignment that is preferred by a majority of the agents. Popular assignments need not exist, but the minimax theorem implies the existence of a popular . assignment. In this paper, we study the compatibility of popularity with o

淡紫色花

Scheduling a Cascade with Opposing Influencesces. Consider a planner trying to introduce an idea in different parts of a society at different times. How should the planner design a schedule considering this fact that positive reaction to the idea in early areas has a positive impact on probability of success in later areas, whereas a flopped r