Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; Third International Spyros Kontogiannis,Elias Koutsoupias,Paul G. Spir Conference proceedings 2010 Springer-Verla

thalamus

PLE

How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard?,cent progress showing that the equilibria that are found by the Lemke-Howson algorithm, as well as related homotopy methods, are PSPACE-complete to compute. Thus we show that there are no short cuts to the Lemke-Howson solutions, subject only to the hardness of PSPACE. I mention some open problems.

假设

Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market,-buyer market game. Surprisingly, all the NE of this game turn out to be symmetric and the corresponding payoffs constitute a piecewise linear concave curve. We also study the correlated equilibria of this game and show that third-party mediation does not help to achieve a better payoff than NE payoffs.

ARK

nascent

On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users,f homogeneous and heterogeneous users differ sharply as far as the existence of strongly-optimal taxes is concerned: there are parallel-link games with linear latencies and heterogeneous users that do not admit strongly-optimal taxes.

conference

Delude

How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard?,s necessarily rather weak, in the sense that PPAD is only know to lie “between P and NP”, and there is not a strong prospect of showing it to be as hard as NP. Of course, the problem of finding an equilibrium that has certain sought-after properties should be at least as hard as finding an unrestric

oncologist

Unsaturated-Fat

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