Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 4th International Sy Giuseppe Persiano Conference proceedings 2011 Springer-Verlag GmbH Berlin Heidelberg 2011 app

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90126-8d axiomatization of the value by Pham Do Norde. In this paper, we propose a dual approach to marginality which allows us to derive the value of McQuillin. Thus, we close the picture outlined by De Clippel and Serrano.

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-19224-2n design an . truthful-in-expectation mechanism, which significantly improves the running complexity of black-box reduction mechanisms that can be applied to the problem, thereby facilitating its implementation in real systems.

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Computation and Incentives of Competitive Equilibria in a Matching Marketof the buyers, to a solution equivalent to the minimum revenue equilibrium under the true preferences of buyers, which in turn is revenue equivalent to a VCG solution..We will also discuss other related issues as well as open problems.

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Prompt Mechanism for Ad Placement over Timehanism is a crucial requirement for our algorithm, since it allows a payment process without any redundant relation between an auctioneer and players. An inability to resolve this problem could even prevent the application of such mechanisms in a real marketing process. We design a 6-approximation p

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The Multiple Attribution Problem in Pay-Per-Conversion Advertisingthe last ad impression. In this paper, we observe how the current method of attribution leads to inefficiency in the allocation mechanism. We develop a fairly general model to capture how a sequence of impressions can lead to a conversion, and solve the optimal ad allocation problem in this model. W

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The Price of Optimum in a Matching Game it can be done in polynomial time. In addition the problem is shown to be APX-hard, since its restriction to graphs admitting a vertex cover is equivalent, from the approximability point of view, to . in general graphs.

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Peer Effects and Stability in Matching Marketsreference ordering. With this model and considering a weaker notion of stability, namely two-sided exchange stability, we prove that stable matchings always exist and characterize the set of stable matchings in terms of social welfare. To characterize the efficiency of matching markets with external