Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 12th International S Dimitris Fotakis,Evangelos Markakis Conference proceedings 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland A

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Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximationproblem, “good” approximations are possible if and only if the agents’ rationality allows for a significant number of contingencies to be considered, thus showing that OSP is not too restrictive a notion of bounded rationality from the point of view of approximation.

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The Impact of Tribalism on Social Welfareayers (i.e. ones who seek to maximise the social welfare). This phenomenon is observed under a variety of equilibrium concepts. In each instance, we present upper bounds on the Price of Tribalism that match the lower bounds established by our example.

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0302-9743 ted from 55 submissions.. The papers are organized in topical sections named: Algorithmic Mechanism Design; Auctions and Markets; Computational Aspects of Games; Network Games and Congestion Games; Social Choice; and Matchings and Fair Division..978-3-030-30472-0978-3-030-30473-7Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349

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Optimal On-Line Allocation Rules with Verificationct than not. Each agent has access to private information about the principal’s payoff if he receives the object. The decision to allocate the object to an agent must be made upon arrival of an agent and is irreversible. There are no monetary transfers but the principal can verify agents’ reports at

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Spartan

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Mechanism Design for Locating a Facility Under Partial Informatione unable to fully specify where their preferred location lies, and instead only provide coarse information—namely, that their preferred location lies in some interval. Given such partial preference information, we explore the design of . deterministic mechanisms, where by . mechanisms we mean ones t

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Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation specific form of bounded rationality, i.e., those who have . contingent reasoning skill whatsoever. We here want to study the relationship between the approximation guarantee of incentive-compatible mechanisms and the . of rationality of the agents, intuitively measured in terms of the number of co