Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; First International Burkhard Monien,Ulf-Peter Schroeder Conference proceedings 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidel

2否定

Die innerbetriebliche Absatzorganisationand sell bandwidth at fixed prices subject to capacity constraints; consumers buy bandwidth between their sources and sinks so as to maximize their value from sending traffic minus the prices they pay to edges. We characterize the price of anarchy and price of stability in these “network pricing” ga

松紧带

捏造

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-93789-6ompeting flows. Analytical and experimental results show the relevance of the Window-game to the real TCP game and provide interesting insight on Nash equilibria of the respective network games. Furthermore, we propose a new algorithmic queue mechanism, called Prince, which at congestion makes a sca

哑巴

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-39686-5ertices of a bipartite graph and trade is allowed only between neighbors. In this model the graph is generated probabilistically, and each buyer is connected via preferential attachment to . sellers. We show that even though the tail of the degree distribution of the sellers gets heavier as . increa

柱廊

Kurvenkongruenzen auf einer ,,,ach (out of . resources) so that her selfish delay there is not much. The problem of “maintaining” global progress while allowing concurrent play is exactly what is examined and answered here. We examine two orthogonal settings : (i) A game where the players decide their moves without global informa

Excitotoxin

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-26466-9 in a resource-constrained environment. There have been some recent proposals to use incentive-based mechanisms (in particular, VCG) for routing in wireless ad-hoc networks, and some frugality bounds are known when the connectivity graph is essentially complete. We show frugality bounds for random g

生意行为

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-98833-1cal . over two (identical) parallel .. We introduce a new measure of ., defined to be the expectation of the square of the maximum . on a link; we call it .. A . (.) is a stable state where no user can improve her (expected) latency by switching her mixed strategy; a .. is one that maximizes Quadrat

男生戴手铐

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-98833-1ppose, given a unit demand flow at Wardrop equilibrium, one increases the demand by . or removes an edge carrying only an .-fraction of flow. We study how the equilibrium responds to such an .-change..Our first surprising finding is that, even for linear latency functions, for every .> 0, there are

烦扰

免除责任

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-26465-2ell as a maximum cost per click, and may not be assigned to more than one slot for a particular search. We give a truthful mechanism under the utility model where bidders try to maximize their clicks, subject to their personal constraints. In addition, we show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism i