Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 8th International Sy Martin Hoefer Conference proceedings 2015 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015 Social netwo

孵卵器

auxiliary

Die Ostdeutschen in ausgewählten Karikaturenes a fraction proportional to her bids. We quantify the inefficiency of Nash equilibria by studying the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of the induced game under complete and incomplete information. When agents’ valuations are concave, we show that the Bayesian Nash equilibria can be arbitrarily inefficient,

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Martin HoeferIncludes supplementary material:

Morose

Lecture Notes in Computer Sciencehttp://image.papertrans.cn/a/image/152942.jpg

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fulcrum

Bureaucracy

Stable Matchings with Ties, Master Preference Lists, and Matroid Constraintsints for hospitals are generalized to matroid constraints. By generalizing the algorithms of O’Malley for the hospitals/residents problem with ties and master lists, we give polynomial-time algorithms for deciding whether there exist a super-stable matching and a strongly stable matching in our model, and finding such matchings if they exist.

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Deprivation, Inequality and Polarizationand satisfies all constraints on restricted pairs, there are two ways of relaxing the constraints by permitting a solution to: (1) be blocked by as few as possible pairs, or (2) violate as few as possible constraints on restricted pairs..Our main theorems prove that for the (bipartite) stable marria