Titlebook: Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V; Designing Mechanisms Peyman Faratin,David C. Parkes,William E. Walsh Conference proceedings 2004 Spri

代表

书目名称Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V影响因子(影响力)




书目名称Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V影响因子(影响力)学科排名




书目名称Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V网络公开度




书目名称Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V网络公开度学科排名




书目名称Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V被引频次




书目名称Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V被引频次学科排名




书目名称Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V年度引用




书目名称Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V年度引用学科排名




书目名称Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V读者反馈




书目名称Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V读者反馈学科排名

Monolithic

中国纪念碑

RECUR

A Decommitment Strategy in a Competitive Multi-agent Transportation Settingr utility levels in case of negotiations with uncertainty about future prospects. In this paper, we study the decommitment concept for the novel setting of a large-scale logistics setting with multiple, competing companies. Orders for transportation of loads are acquired by agents of the (competing)

Kindle

才能

Mechanism for Optimally Trading Off Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-unit Auctionspending on the objective of the seller, different selling mechanisms are desirable. The Vickrey auction with a truthful reserve price is optimal when the objective is efficiency – allocating the units to the parties who values them the most. The Myerson auction is optimal when the objective is the s

Extricate

Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Strategy Nash Equilibriumtrategy space is often populated with ., such as myopic best-response to prices. Given these heuristic strategies, it can be useful to evaluate the strategies and the auction design by computing a Nash equilibrium across the restricted strategy space. First, it is necessary to compute the expected p

不适

Terrace

占卜者