Titlebook: Advances in Dynamic Games; Applications to Econ Andrzej S. Nowak,Krzysztof Szajowski Book 2005 Birkhäuser Boston 2005 Markov.agents.algorit

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FELON

Kerstin Stolzenberg,Krischan Heberlefined in a characteristic function form. In order to allow coalitions to evolve, we embed them in the set of fuzzy coalitions. Hence, we define the dynamic core as a set-valued map associating with each fuzzy coalition and each time the set of allotments is such that their payoffs at that time to th

神圣将军

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78855-3ased on it are introduced. The new concept of “imputation distribution procedure” (IDP) is defined and connected with the basic definitions of time-consistency and strong time-consistency. Sufficient conditions of the existence of time-consistent solutions are derived. For a large class of games whe

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ABHOR

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62187-5 stage. When the chain is stopped the game terminates and Player 1 receives from Player 2 a sum depending on the player who stopped the chain and on its current state. If the game continues infinitely, then Player 1 gets “the payoff at infinity” depending on the “limiting” behavior of the chain traj

抓住他投降

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62187-5jects) from a known continuous distribution appearing according to some renewal process with the object of choosing the largest one. The horizon of observation is a positive random variable independent of objects. The observation of the random variables is imperfect and the players are informed only

Bureaucracy

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62187-5erview list. The applicants come in random order and their salary demands are distinct. Two managers, I and II, interview them one at a time. The aim of the manager is to obtain the applicant who demands minimal salary. When both managers want to accept the same candidate, then some rule of assignme

CANON

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Auslöser von UnternehmenswandelWe discuss the risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium concept in static non-cooperative games and two-stage stochastic games of resource extraction. Two equilibrium theorems are established for the latter class of games. Provided examples explain the meaning of risk-sensitive equilibria in games with random moves.

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