Titlebook: Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2011; 30th Annual Internat Kenneth G. Paterson Conference proceedings 2011 International Association for

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Wolfgang Schiller MD,Jan F. Gummert MD, PhDer implementation effort by Smart and Vercauteren (PKC 2010). Smart and Vercauteren implemented the underlying “somewhat homomorphic” scheme, but were not able to implement the bootstrapping functionality that is needed to get the complete scheme to work. We show a number of optimizations that allow

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An Overview of Congenital Heart Surgery,this in multiple ways, such as enabling encryption of both signature and message while proving validity. More importantly, given a ciphertext, a signer can create a verifiably encrypted signature on the encrypted (unknown) message, which leads to the same result as first signing the message and then

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Margaret M. Burgoyne R.N., M.S., C.R.N.A.l fraction of its bit length. This problem has recently received considerable attention, with different solutions optimizing different parameters. We study the problem in an extended setting, where the weak key is a one-time . that is derived from a public source of randomness with the help of a (po

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Ming Hao Guo,Janet M. C. Ngu,Marc Ruelpped by Eve. We consider the case that Alice and Bob do not have any sources of initial randomness at their disposal. We start by discussing special cases of interest where SKE is impossible and then provide a simple SKE construction over binary symmetric channels that achieves some rates of secret

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Demetrios Stefanou,Ioannis Dimarakiser the condition .(.–1)/3. The size of share . of the scheme satisfies . = ., which was the most efficient scheme known so far. In this paper, we propose new .-out-of-. secret sharing schemes capable of identifying cheaters. The proposed scheme possesses the same security parameters .,. as those of

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Conduits for Coronary Artery Bypass Surgeryhan the average value. Moreover, we apply our methods to the block ciphers PUFFIN and PRESENT. For PUFFIN, a 128 bit key cipher, we present an attack which breaks the cipher for at least a quarter of the keys with a complexity less than 2.. In the case of PRESENT we show that the design is sound. Th