Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 17th International C Michal Feldman,Hu Fu,Inbal Talgam-Cohen Conference proceedings 2022 Springer Nature Switze

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书目名称Web and Internet Economics影响因子(影响力)




书目名称Web and Internet Economics影响因子(影响力)学科排名




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书目名称Web and Internet Economics网络公开度学科排名




书目名称Web and Internet Economics被引频次




书目名称Web and Internet Economics被引频次学科排名




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书目名称Web and Internet Economics年度引用学科排名




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书目名称Web and Internet Economics读者反馈学科排名

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Two-Way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationalityn computer science under the general umbrella of algorithmic mechanism design. Novel algorithmic properties and paradigms have been identified and studied in the literature. Our work stems from the observation that selfishness is different from rationality; agents will attempt to strategize whenever

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Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trialswe model by considering multi-phase trials with different experiments conducted based on the outcomes of prior experiments. In contrast to most of the literature, we consider the problem with constraints on signals imposed on the sender. This we achieve by fixing some of the experiments in an exogen

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The Optimality of Upgrade Pricingricing—a menu of product bundles that are nested in the strong set order. Our approach exploits duality methods to identify conditions on the distribution of consumer types under which (a) each product is purchased by the same set of buyers as under separate monopoly pricing (though the transfers ca

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On Symmetries in Multi-dimensional Mechanism Designion of additive buyers with independent (but not necessarily identically distributed) item values, bundling all items together achieves a constant-factor approximation to the revenue-optimal item-symmetric mechanism..We further motivate this direction via fairness in ad auctions. In ad auction domai