Titlebook: War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus; Julie Fedor,Markku Kangaspuro,Tatiana Zhurzhenko Book 2017 The Editor(s) (if applicable) an

令人不快

让空气进入

Political Uses of the Great Patriotic War in Post-Soviet Russia from Yeltsin to Putin of Russian national identity. The focus is on political uses of the war memory by the governing political elite, that is, by those who speak on behalf of the state or who have sufficient resources to influence the official symbolic policy. The chapter analyzes political speeches and media coverage

Musket

胆汁

Reclaiming the Past, Confronting the Past: OUN–UPA Memory Politics and Nation Building in Ukraine (1 (OUN) and its military, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), from 1991 to the present. Via an analysis of the changing official political discourse over this period, the chapter investigates what role the issue of the history of the OUN and UPA has played in Ukrainian political debates, and how it h

极端的正确性

犬儒主义者

Introduction: War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus,aine. It outlines the main contours of the interplay between “memory wars” and real war, and the important “post-Crimean” qualitative shift in local memory cultures in this connection. Next, the essay sketches out the specifics of the war memory landscapes of the region, and then of each of the thre

conjunctiva

债务

Mercantile

过于光泽

“Unhappy Is the Person Who Has No Motherland”: National Ideology and History Writing in Lukashenka’sriods can be identified: between 1994 and 2001 the Lukashenka government officially promoted moves towards ever-closer integration with Russia, while after 2001 the regime has put a heavier emphasis on independence and statehood. Whereas the legacy of the Belarusian SSR retains a central role in the