Titlebook: Wanting and Intending; Elements of a Philos Neil Roughley Book 2016 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016 Question of Motivational

Carminative

The Question of Motivational Unity: Historical Preliminariesphy. The founding question for a philosophy of practical mind is raised by Aristotle when he asks what it is in the soul that originates movement. I discuss the answers to this question proposed by Plato, Aristotle himself, Hobbes and Hume, before rounding off the historical survey with a look at th

行乞

The Question of Motivational Unity: Historical Preliminariesphy. The founding question for a philosophy of practical mind is raised by Aristotle when he asks what it is in the soul that originates movement. I discuss the answers to this question proposed by Plato, Aristotle himself, Hobbes and Hume, before rounding off the historical survey with a look at th

想象

Motivational States that this is the founding question not only of a philosophy of practical mind, but also of empirical motivational psychology, I approach the topic with an eye to how motivational psychologists circumscribe their discipline. The chapter proposes a skeletal understanding of motivated behaviour, the t

GRIEF

Osmosis

Wanting* and Its Symptomsthe “modal” and representational features of motivational states, on the one hand, and the physiological mechanisms brought together under the functional concept of motivational force on the other. It also allows us to see that other attitudinal features, specifically beliefs, are generally involved

悄悄移动

和蔼

不能仁慈

Cholagogue

Wanting*, Consciousness and Affectits linguistic expression suggests that conscious thoughts of the appropriate form are sufficient for their bearer to be the bearer of the corresponding attitude. I argue that this is indeed so, although no such thought is necessary for a want’s* correct ascription. Cases of what I call “subintentio

eulogize

Wanting*, Consciousness and Affectits linguistic expression suggests that conscious thoughts of the appropriate form are sufficient for their bearer to be the bearer of the corresponding attitude. I argue that this is indeed so, although no such thought is necessary for a want’s* correct ascription. Cases of what I call “subintentio